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February 2019
“Hurricane Maria laid bare the painful reality that Puerto Rico is an inconsequential
American territory inhabited by second-class US citizens.”

Hurricane Maria’s Aftermath:
Redefining Puerto Rico’s Colonial Status?
PEDRO CABÁN

H

urricane Maria was a singular event in
Puerto Rico’s history. The storm struck on
September 20, 2017, and left unparalleled
devastation in its wake. At least 2,975 people lost
their lives in the storm and its aftermath. Property
damage and lost economic output exceeded $95
billion. The Trump administration’s emergency
and recovery response was widely criticized as inadequate and mismanaged. Maria shattered many
Puerto Ricans’ belief that the United States would
never allow a humanitarian crisis to imperil the
lives of its citizens.
The desultory response to the disaster has revived a lingering debate over the viability of
Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status. It was a sobering reminder that Puerto Rico is not equal to
the member states of the union. In fact, nothing
has changed since 1901, when the Supreme Court
ruled that Puerto Rico was merely “a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but
not part of the United States.” Hurricane Maria
laid bare the painful reality that Puerto Rico is an
inconsequential American territory inhabited by
second-class US citizens.
From its seizure by the United States in 1898 in
the Spanish-American War until the dissolution of
the Soviet Union in 1991, Puerto Rico was a valuable strategic asset and a highly profitable investment site for US corporate capital. However, during the past quarter-century Puerto Rico has seen
its status as America’s shining star in the Caribbean
slowly dim. The US Navy shuttered its sprawling

base there over two decades ago after belatedly acknowledging that it had become an anachronistic
military asset unsuitable for training for modern
warfare. Similarly, multinational corporations that
once extracted great profits from Puerto Rico have
essentially abandoned it.
Globalization and a reconceptualization of US
strategic interests in a transformed geopolitical
environment have had a devastating impact on
the once prized territory. Through no fault of its
own, Puerto Rico is no longer regarded as an advantageous possession by the United States. This
change in Puerto Rico’s status in the American empire ultimately made the island particularly vulnerable to Maria’s destructive force.

ECONOMIC SHOCKS
Hurricane Maria was the culmination of a series of shocks that hit Puerto Rico over the past
decade and a half—a ruinous trifecta of economic
crises. The first was set in motion in 1996, when
President Bill Clinton signed legislation phasing
out Section 936, a provision of the US tax code
that granted an exemption for corporate income
from operations in Puerto Rico. When the tax incentive expired in 2006, corporations abandoned
the island and manufacturing employment plummeted.
In 2004, the Navy closed the sprawling Roosevelt Roads military complex. Thousands of jobs
were lost, and the millions of dollars the Pentagon
spent on construction and base operations stopped
flowing into the local economy. Demilitarization
aggravated the already precarious economic situation caused by the termination of Section 936.
Both of these developments propelled Puerto Rico
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into a depression starting in 2006. For 11 of the
to Rican government’s fiscal powers was the third
past 12 years, the island has endured negative
shock that befell the island before Hurricane Maria.
Paul Ryan, then the speaker of the US House
growth rates.
of Representatives and one of the architects of
With tax revenue depleted by the depression,
PROMESA, justified the legislation by asserting that
successive Puerto Rican governments increased
Puerto Rico “paved the way for this disaster with
their reliance on municipal bonds to balance the
decades of irresponsible policies like overspendbudget and pay for essential public services, even
ing and fiscal mismanagement.”
as they sought to control costs by imposing austerLikewise, President Donald Trump has regularity. Out-migration increased markedly as the ecoly disparaged Puerto Rican politicians as incompenomic crisis wore on, particularly among skilled
tent and corrupt, a theme he has returned to since
and educated workers. The exodus further rethe hurricane. On October 23, 2018, he claimed
duced the tax base.
As investment capital dried up, government offithat “inept politicians are trying to use . . . disaster
cials worked with Wall Street financial firms to agfunding to pay off other obligations.”
gressively market bond issues. Puerto Rico quickly
ERODING INFRASTRUCTURE
amassed a staggering debt, which tripled from $25
Puerto Ricans were stunned by the severity of
billion in 2000 to $74 billion by 2016. The government also had unfunded public-employee penthe devastation that Hurricane Maria left in its
sion obligations of nearly $50 billion. Almost half
wake. But the great loss of life and massive destructhe bond debt was acquired during the tenures of
tion cannot be explained solely by Maria’s wrath.
governors Luis Fortuño (2009–13) of the New ProPuerto Rico was woefully unprepared to protect
gressive Party, which advocates
itself from the fearsome powstatehood, and Alejandro García
er of a Category 4 hurricane.
Padilla (2013–17) of the PopuWell before Maria, its physical
Puerto Rico has been
lar Democratic Party, which
and human infrastructure was
favors maintaining commonin a state of severe disrepair.
undergoing systemic
wealth status.
For over a decade, the governdepopulation.
On June 29, 2015, García Pament and public corporations
dilla shocked the bond market
curtailed spending for maintewhen he announced that Puernance of critical systems, parto Rico lacked the financial resources to meet its
ticularly the electrical grid.
In 2009, the Fortuño administration pushed
debt obligations. In April 2016, he warned that the
through the draconian Special Act to Declare a
island’s fiscal situation was “more dire than at any
State of Fiscal Emergency in an effort to reduce
other point in its history” and it might be forced
the mounting budget deficit and prevent further
to choose between honoring its commitments to
deterioration of its credit rating. The measure
bondholders and continuing to provide residents
was Puerto Rico’s first attempt to impose a severe
with essential services. Congress acted quickly—
neoliberal austerity program in order to shrink
to protect the bondholders.
the state bureaucracy. Government funding was
On July 1, 2016, President Barack Obama signed
slashed by 20 percent. Tens of thousands of pubinto law the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management,
lic employees were dismissed, wages were frozen,
and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). The act
established the Financial Oversight and Manageunion contracts were suspended, and worker
ment Board (FOMB), known in Puerto Rico as la
benefits were curtailed. Many Puerto Ricans took
junta. The law gives the board, whose members are
part in demonstrations against Fortuño’s regressive policies.
appointed by Congress and the president, broad
García Padilla followed suit, cutting spending
powers over the local government’s fiscal and ecoon physical infrastructure as well as the already
nomic policies.
The FOMB has the authority to order the govstressed human infrastructure: education, health
ernment to implement its recommendations. It can
and hospitals, sanitation, and nutrition services.
block the enforcement or execution of certain conHe increased the sales tax and imposed a new tax
tracts, executive orders, and “any territorial law or
on services which had a disproportionate impact
regulation that is inconsistent with [PROMESA] or
on the working and middle classes. About 50 perfiscal reform plans.” The junta’s seizure of the Puercent of the revenue from these taxes was used to
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service the debt. The government also cut investments in roads, water-treatment facilities, public
schools, and other critical infrastructure from $2.4
billion in 2012 to $906 million in 2017. The university budget was slashed by 20 percent.
Although the combined Fortuño and García Padilla austerity measures failed to reduce the debt,
they increased unemployment, income inequality,
and poverty while reducing public services for the
most vulnerable members of society. After years of
systematically defunding its physical and human
infrastructure, Puerto Rico was highly vulnerable
to a catastrophic storm like Hurricane Maria.

A COLONIAL ECONOMY
On the surface, Puerto Rico may have appeared
to be a modern Caribbean society that could withstand and recover quickly from a major hurricane.
But Maria ripped off the thin veneer of modernity
and exposed the fault lines in contemporary colonialism.
For over 120 years, Congress has denied Puerto
Rico self-rule and the authority to control its political economy. Since Puerto Rico is prohibited
by the United States from filing for relief under
Chapter 9 of the federal bankruptcy code (which
is intended for municipalities), it enacted its own
bankrupcy law in 2014. The bondholders sued
Puerto Rico, and the US Supreme Court sided with
them in 2016, ruling that federal law superseded
the Puerto Rican bankruptcy law. However, the
PROMESA bill contains a provision (Title III) that
allows the FOMB to file a petition for debt restructuring in federal court on behalf of Puerto Rico.
The limited fiscal autonomy that Congress had
unofficially conferred in 1952 was stripped away
by PROMESA. Since it is not sovereign, Puerto Rico
cannot join the International Monetary Fund, enter into international treaties, or obtain emergency
lending or development funds from multilateral
lending institutions.
Because Puerto Rico has no voting member in
the US Congress, the federal government enacts
policies that literally have life-or-death consequences for Puerto Ricans without their consent.
This form of colonialism has saddled Puerto Rico
with an economy that is on life support, dependent on continuous infusions of American corporate capital and federal transfers.
In 1947, Puerto Rico initiated a successful “industrialization by invitation” development program, dubbed Operation Bootstrap, which attracted hundreds of US-owned factories to the island.

In order to sustain the confidence of investors, the
Puerto Rican government had to prioritize corporate profitability. Acting through self-financed
state-owned corporations, it established a modern
infrastructure that offered private firms subsidized
services vital to their operations.
Between 1947 and 1963, the island’s annual
GDP growth rate was 6.6 percent, which exceeded
that of the United States. The economy continued
to grow rapidly over the next decade, increasing
at an average annual rate of 7.7 percent from 1964
through 1973, and reaching an all-time high of
13.8 percent in 1971.
During the Cold War, Puerto Rico was portrayed
as an “economic miracle” and used in a global ideological campaign against communism and the
nonaligned movement. The territory was held up
as proof positive that small, labor-abundant, open
economies could develop industrially under American tutelage. However, as the historian Gordon
Lewis has pointed out, Puerto Rico’s industrialization was the result of “artificial advantages” that
flowed from its colonial status.
Its growth was possible because corporations investing in Puerto Rico were beneficiaries
of preferential federal tax legislation, as well as
low wages, industrial subsidies and incentives,
and other inducements including tax exemptions granted by the Puerto Rican government.
An array of other “artificial advantages” accruing
to Puerto Rico because of its status as a colony
facilitated growth, such as the common currency and customs system, unrestricted emigration
to the United States, and billions of dollars in
federal transfers: Medicaid, Social Security, and
veterans pensions, direct aid (such as nutrition
assistance), and subsidies for the Puerto Rican
administration’s operations.
Unemployment was kept at tolerable levels because robust labor markets in the United States
attracted Puerto Rican workers. The government
sponsored this migration. During the “Great Migration” of 1950–60, 470,000 Puerto Ricans left
the island.
However, the rapid pace of postwar economic
growth could not be sustained. Growth plummeted
to 1.7 percent annually during the 1973–77 recession. By the mid-1970s, Puerto Rico was no longer
an internationally competitive site for American
manufacturing capital. Many labor-intensive firms
relocated to newly industrializing countries where
they could enjoy higher profit margins thanks to
much lower wages.
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The removal of surplus population through
emigration, along with federal transfers and subsidies, prevented Puerto Rico’s social fabric from
unraveling and allowed local elites to maintain
the fiction that they were effectively managing the
economy. Yet it was not only successive local administrations that were reluctant to extricate the
island from a flawed development model. The
federal government was unwilling to grant Puerto
Rico the autonomy it needed to formulate alternative approaches.
But Puerto Rico was developing into a political
embarrassment for the United States. The increasing unemployment and poverty on the island, the
growing exodus of Puerto Ricans, and heightened political agitation over economic and social
inequalities revealed deep problems in the once
valued colony. The New York Times commented
in 1976 that the “heady days of ‘Operation Bootstrap,’ when Puerto Rico was hailed as a model for
developing small countries, are definitely over.”
During this period of economic decline and political tension, Congress enacted Section 936 in
1976 to promote investment by different industrial sectors. The provision induced capital-intensive
companies to invest in Puerto Rico by allowing
them to retain profits free of federal taxes. Manufacturers of electronics, medical devices, and particularly pharmaceuticals took advantage of the
tax exemption and flocked to the island. However,
these heavily capitalized firms had a marginal impact on manufacturing employment since they essentially replaced the more labor-intensive firms
that had abandoned Puerto Rico.
In series of reports starting in 1978, the US Treasury Department concluded that the tax provision
was depriving the federal government of billions
of dollars in tax revenue, while the firms benefiting from the incentive failed to generate sufficient
employment to justify their gains. Twenty years
after Section 936 was enacted, Clinton ordered a
10-year phaseout of the law. Investments in manufacturing dwindled.
The termination of Section 936 signaled the beginning of the end of Puerto Rico’s manufacturingbased economy and forced the government to rely
on debt financing to generate the revenue it desperately needed to sustain its operations. But nonstop borrowing and subsequent defaults prompted
the credit-rating agenices to steadily downgrade
Puerto Rican bonds until the island government
was locked out of the credit markets. Its economic
fate would be decided by the FOMB.

DRACONIAN DOWNSIZING
In October 2018, more than a year after Maria,
the FOMB released a fiscal plan to put Puerto Rico
on the path to financial solvency. The junta will
downsize the public bureaucracy, close and consolidate hospitals, privatize public corporations,
eliminate worker-protection legislation, and make
other changes that will transform Puerto Rico’s
economy and society.
According to the FOMB, “increasing labor force
participation and job creation may be the single
most important reform for long-term economic
well-being in Puerto Rico.” Law 80, which imposes penalties on employers that dismiss workers without cause, is anathema to the junta. To increase the workforce, the junta asserts that Puerto
Rico will need to become an “at-will employment”
jurisdiction.
The FOMB also maintains that generous social
welfare benefits contribute to the low labor participation rate, since “working in the informal sector and collecting transfer benefits” can “result in
higher effective income than working in the formal sector.” Thus, the junta proposes welfare reforms that will reward “citizens who participate in
the formal economy.” The fiscal plan also calls for
a 10-percent cut in the public pension system and
a 30-percent cut in funding for public services.
The labor-market reforms proposed in this plan
are so unpopular that the legislature, controlled by
the pro-statehood party, has refused to approve enabling legislation. However, in October the FOMB
certified the fiscal plan over the opposition of Governor Ricardo Rosello. “This is not a fiscal plan for
economic development, this is an austerity plan,”
Rosello complained. While he conceded that the
plan will generate savings, Rosello said that the
“money will be available to bondholders, but to
the detriment of the most vulnerable of our people. This is simply unfair.”
One key institution targeted in the junta’s austerity drive is the University of Puerto Rico (UPR),
an island-wide, 11-campus system with nearly
60,000 students. The FOMB’s plan for the university will cut its allocation of government funding
by $211 million, about a third of its budget. The
system will be consolidated into fewer campuses,
tuition doubled, fees increased, and student enrollment cut. The teaching staff will be reduced as
well.
These cuts will gut the university system, erode
its ability to conduct research, and result in fewer
graduates prepared to teach in the public schools

Redefining Puerto Rico’s Colonial Status? • 47

and work in government agencies or business
ment that implements them will lose legitimacy
management. By doubling tuition, the junta will
and popular support.
radically diminish the university’s capacity to conEXODUS
tinue serving as one of the key channels of upward
Hurricane Maria accelerated the exodus of
social mobility for Puerto Rico’s poor.
The assault on the university system offers an
Puerto Ricans that began in 2004 when the econoinsight into the FOMB’s plans for Puerto Rico’s
my started to contract and the government began
economy, particularly its human capital needs. UPR
dismissing thousands of public-sector employees.
educates the vast majority of the island’s publicAfter 2010, as the US economy recovered from the
Great Recession, out-migration intensified. Ecosector employees, including health professionals.
nomic and social conditions had become unbearThe FOMB envisions a streamlined or “right-sized”
state that will provide fewer public services, an
able for many Puerto Ricans mired in joblessness
economy in which public corporations are dismanand poverty, with a dilapidated infrastructure and
tled or privatized, and a low-wage private sector
rapidly deteriorating public health-care and school
that will need far fewer educated workers for mansystems. In April 2010, the official unemployment
agement positions.
rate was just shy of 17 percent, and almost half the
Three successive governments have reduced
population was living in poverty.
public-sector employment and reformed labor
During the past decade and a half, the numbers
laws to decrease wages and weaken job protecof Puerto Ricans migrating to the United States
tions. Even under the best-case scenario, Puerto
exceeded the numbers that left during the “Great
Rico will experience negative growth for at least
Migration” of the 1950s. The Pew Foundation
several more years, so employment prospects for
has reported that between 2005 and 2015, about
educated workers are dim.
446,000 Puerto Ricans migratThe situation for Puerto
ed to the mainland. By 2015,
Ricans will deteriorate furthe population had declined by
The idea that Puerto Ricans
ther when federal transfers
more than 10 percent from its
are a divided nation has
are reduced in five years and
peak of 3.8 million in 2004.
been debunked.
hurricane-related funding is
An estimated 130,000 peoexhausted. The austerity meaple, almost 4 percent of the
sures will lead to further emipopulation, migrated to the
gration of the most skilled and valued workers.
mainland between July 2017 and July 2018, with
The FOMB is restructuring capitalist developthe largest numbers leaving in the aftermath of
ment in the colony as it conducts an experiment in
Hurricane Maria. The Center for Puerto Rican
social engineering. Whatever economic model lies
Studies estimates that between 2017 and 2019,
in Puerto Rico’s future, it will be based on extractPuerto Rico may lose 14 percent of its population,
ing more value from a vulnerable labor force. Actabout 470,000 people.
ing as the federal government’s fiscal enforcement
For the first time in its history, Puerto Rico has
agent, the junta’s task is to create a new technobeen undergoing systemic depopulation. Currentcratic state that will ensure Puerto Rico subsidizes
ly, more Puerto Ricans live in the United States
its continued colonial subordination. The costs of
(5.4 million) than in Puerto Rico (3.2 million),
maintaining the colony must be borne by its inand the growth of the US resident population will
easily outpace that of the island. Puerto Ricans are
habitants.
leaving because they envision a dystopian future
Although many economists argue that the
FOMB’s fiscal plan will not generate economic
for their homeland.
growth for some time, it is virtually certain that
The social and economic impact of the postit will remain in place until a settlement has been
Maria exodus on Puerto Rico’s future economic
reached with the hedge funds and institutional ingrowth will be serious. College-educated and
vestors that hold most of Puerto Rico’s debt. But
skilled Puerto Ricans are leaving in unprecedentforcibly aligning the labor market to the needs of
ed numbers. A rising death rate among an older
US business interests, as the government reduces
age distribution together with a declining fertility
vital public services, is politically risky and can
rate will further shrink the population. There is
generate resistance. The proposed changes are so
little prospect for a sustainable economic recovery
drastic that any democratically elected governgiven the continued depletion of the island’s hu-
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man capital: its teachers, doctors and health care
professionals, engineers and technicians, and experienced managers.
The FOMB’s policies further encourage outmigration. Many of the measures enacted by both
the junta and the local government create oppressive labor-market conditions that will spur young
people to leave the island. The huge contraction of
the public-sector workforce has reduced employment opportunities. The attack on UPR and the
public education system discourages young families from staying in Puerto Rico. In short, a ruthless austerity regime has been imposed to achieve
fiscal solvency and to promote the migration of
Puerto Ricans who will have no role in the restructured economy envisioned by the junta.

CAMs) that pooled resources and raised money to

meet the urgent need for food, water, and medical
supplies and for recovery and rebuilding. Faced
with what organizers called “the collapse of the
state and the abuses of FEMA in post-Maria Puerto
Rico,” they also set up “discussion spaces to generate critical thinking and the understanding that
we are facing a political disaster that is even more
dangerous than the natural disaster.” Technologically savvy Puerto Ricans established the Red de
Apoyo Mutuo (Network for Mutual Assistance) to
serve as an independent platform for the CAMs and
diaspora organizations to “communicate, collaborate, and coordinate their decentralized activities.”
Puerto Ricans in the United States organized a
nationwide emergency assistance campaign to help
the people on the devastated island as soon as the
TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM
hurricane struck. Community-based advocacy orThe Rosello administration was roundly critiganizations raised substantial donations and collected vital supplies for shipment to the island.
cized for failing to prepare for Hurricane Maria
Puerto Ricans in the diaspora responded more imand for its incompetence in staging the emergency
mediately and effectively to the
response. However, the stroncrisis than the federal governgest criticisms were directed
ment did.
at the Federal Emergency
Maria exposed
This post-Maria community
Management Administration
response has been ground(FEMA), which was excoriated
the fault lines in
for its handling of the crisis
breaking in its scale and also
contemporary colonialism.
and held responsible for hunbecause it was organized outdreds of deaths. Investigations
side the spaces controlled by
conducted by the Government
the local government and federAccounting Office, FEMA itself, and independent
al agencies operating in Puerto Rico. The unmediagencies concluded that FEMA’s response ranged
ated and spontaneous engagement between Puerto
from incompetent to negligent. (Trump was an exRicans on the mainland and on the island may also
ception, congratulating FEMA for doing “an unapbe a bellwether of a new form of anticolonial activpreciated great job.”)
ism. The closer connection between the diaspora
By contrast, when Hurricane Harvey hit the
and the colony made possible by new social media
Houston area a month before Maria struck Puerto
technologies has transformed the scale and freRico, FEMA had quickly deployed more personquency of Puerto Rican transnational interaction.
nel and allocated greater resources to Texas. Three
REIMAGINING THE FUTURE
months after Maria, the Inter-American CommisThe flow of people, knowledge, and supplies
sion on Human Rights reported that it was “deeply
managed by autonomous organizations was fodismayed by the United States’ lack of response to
cused on hurricane-recovery efforts, but also ofeffectively protect the human rights of the Puerto
fers a glimpse of a more sustainable and resilient
Rican people.” When criticized for the federal govPuerto Rico with diminished reliance on US capital
ernment’s bungled emergency relief effort, Trump
and the federal government. This novel form of
blamed Puerto Ricans, tweeting: “They want evcultural politics is quickly dismantling the artifierything to be done for them when it should be a
cial divisions that historically have been manufaccommunity effort.”
tured by Puerto Rico’s political leadership to segIn fact, rather than waiting for government asregate boricuas residing in the United States from
sistance, Puerto Ricans reacted quickly. Throughthose on the island.
out the island, residents organized relief and reThe idea that Puerto Ricans are a divided nacovery campaigns. They established self-managed
tion, and that they constitute two linguistically and
Centros de Apoyo Mutuo (Mutual Aid Centers or
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culturally separate peoples, was always questionable—but now it has been debunked. Nowhere is
the fallacy of a divided nation more evident than
in the way the diaspora community has embraced
the hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans who
have sought refuge and a new life in United States.
Hurricane Maria revealed that Puerto Ricans in
the colony and in the diaspora embrace a common
national identity. Puerto Rican identity is defined
by distinctive cultural and linguistic attributes and
by the shared history of a colonized and racialized
people.
However, the current crisis has generated unprecedented migration, a virtually complete collapse of the local economy, and harsh austerity
measures that are creating a dystopian level of
precarity not experienced since the 1930s. This
has led to the realization that the viability of Puerto Rican society and its distinctive way of life is
threatened. Growing numbers of Puerto Ricans in
the diaspora and on the island believe that the old
colonial arrangement is untenable. A new political
arrangement with the United States is necessary—
one that acknowledges Puerto Rican national
identity as unbounded by geography.
But colonialism denies the residents of Puerto
Rico the political means to redefine the terms
of their association with the United States and
shape the future of their island nation. The diaspora community, dispersed throughout the United

States, also lacks the political power to shift federal policy.
Puerto Ricans migrate between one identity
as colonized subjects, with its embedded tropes
of inferiority, and another racialized identity that
is denigrated and marginalized in the American
white-supremacist social order. One of the most
persistent colonial representations of Puerto Ricans is that they are a “dependent people” incapable of surviving on their own. But instead of falling into hopelessness and fatalism in the days and
months following Maria, Puerto Ricans displayed
activism and resilience—refuting this degrading
depiction.
Puerto Ricans on the island and in the diaspora
are more skeptical now than ever about the statehood and commonwealth parties’ fanciful claims
that they alone can persuade the United States
to ease its colonial control over Puerto Rico. If
Washington chooses to revisit the long-standing
colonial formula, it will do so for two reasons.
First, Puerto Rico is inconsequential to American economic and geopolitical interests, and too
costly to sustain. And second, popular activism,
resistance, and self-sufficiency will permanently
damage the credibility of the island’s ideologically
bankrupt political parties. Hurricane Maria exposed the failings of the current colonial system
and has created new space for the people to reimagine Puerto Rico’s political future.
■

